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Abstract:  The Halting Problem is a version of the Liar's Paradox.
Epimenides
An ancient  Cretan named Epimenides is  reported to  have said “All  Cretans are  liars.”  [1]. 
This is supposed to be self-contradictory, but it misses the mark.  If there is any other Cretan, 
and that Cretan is a truth-teller, then Epimenides' sentence is simply false:  Epimenides is a liar, 
but not all Cretans are liars.  St. Paul missed the point completely, taking Epimenides' statement 
at face value, and elaborating: “It was one of themselves, one of their own prophets, who said, 
“Cretans  were  never  anything  but  liars,  dangerous  animals,  and  lazy”:   and  that  is  a  true 
statement.” [5].  I will refer to the simpler sentence
This sentence is false.
as the Liar's Paradox.  If that sentence is true, then, according to the sentence, it is false.  If it is 
false, then it is true.  That simple sentence is self-contradictory.
I give the sentence a name, say  L  for Liar.
L:   L  is false.
 As a mathematical formula, it becomes
L = (L=false)
As an equation in unknown  L , it has no solution, because the equation is  false  regardless of 
whether  L  is  true  or  false .  As a definition or specification of  L  it is called “inconsistent”. 
(I am using italic  true  and  false  for the boolean constants representing truth and falsity.)
A slightly more complicated version presents the inconsistency as two sentences.
The next sentence is true.
The previous sentence is false.
Naming the first sentence  B  and the second  G , as mathematical formulas, they become
B = (G=true)
G = (B=false)
These two equations in the two unknowns  B  and  G  have no solution:  there is no assignment 
of boolean values to  B  and  G  that satisfies the two equations.  They are inconsistent.  If you 
look at either one of the sentences alone, there is no inconsistency.  It may make sense to say 
that the next sentence is true, and it may make sense to say that the previous sentence is false. 
But together they are inconsistent.
Let  me complicate  this  inconsistency by  adding a  parameter,  so   B   can  say  whether  any 
sentence is true, not just sentence  G .  To reduce contention over truth and falsity, I will stick 
with  mathematical  sentences,  otherwise  known  as  boolean  expressions  (allowing 
subexpressions of any type, including functions).  To pass sentences as data, we need to encode 
them in some way.  The easiest encoding is as a character string.  Now  B  becomes a function 
from strings to booleans, and the pair of sentences become
B (s)   =   true  if string  s  represents a boolean expression with value  true ;
     false  otherwise
G   =   “ B (G) = false ” 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I have made two definitions:   B  and  G .  Since  G  is just a character string, there cannot be 
anything wrong with its definition;  it represents the boolean expression  B (G) = false .  But the 
definition of  B , no matter how carefully worded, no matter how clear it sounds, conceals an 
inconsistency.  I am not concerned with computing  B ;  I just want to define a mathematical 
function.  The parameter allows us to show a large number of examples, like  B (“0=0”) = true 
and  B (“0=1”) = false , which are not problematic.  They may fool us into believing that the 
definition of  B  makes sense.  But they are irrelevant. The inconsistency is revealed by applying 
B  to  G .  If  B (G) = true , then  G  represents a  false  expression, so  B (G)  should be  false . 
If  B (G) = false , then  G  represents a  true  expression, so  B (G)  should be  true .  The 
inconsistency is the same as in the unparameterized, unencoded version of the Liar's Paradox.
Gödel
The Liar's Paradox is about truth.  Gödel used the same self-contradictory construction to talk 
about provability [2].  He used a numeric, rather than string, encoding of sentences, and he used 
the name  Bew  (short for Beweisbar, which is German for provable) for a function similar to 
B .   The sentence encoded by  G  is popularly called “the Gödel sentence”.  With our notations 
and encoding,  B  and  G  become
B (s)   =   true  if string  s  represents a provable boolean expression;
     false  otherwise
G   =   “ B (G) = false ”
Now we ask:  Is  B (G) = true ?  If we suppose  B (G) = true , then  G  represents a  false 
sentence, and in a consistent logic, no  false  sentence is provable, so  B (G)  should be  false . 
If we suppose  B (G) = false , then  G  represents a  true  sentence, and in a complete logic, all 
true  sentences are provable, so  B (G)  should be  true .  Gödel concluded that if a logic is 
expressive enough to define  B , then the logic is either inconsistent or incomplete.
Turing
Epimenides  talked  about  truth;   Gödel  talked  about  provability;   Turing  talked  about 
computability using the same sort of arguments [4].  For my examples, I will use the Pascal 
programming language, but the choice of language is irrelevant;  any other general-purpose 
programming language would do just as well.  I'll start with a procedure named  liar  that is 
closely analogous to the Liar's Paradox.
procedure liar;
begin
if (execution of  liar  terminates) then liar
end
I have not finished writing procedure  liar ;  what remains is to replace the informal boolean 
expression  (execution  of   liar   terminates)  with  either   true   or   false  ,  whichever  one  is 
appropriate.  The problem in doing so is that the informal boolean expression refers to itself in a 
self-contradictory manner:  if the execution of procedure  liar  terminates, it should be replaced 
with  true , creating a procedure whose execution does not terminate;  if the execution of  liar 
does not terminate, it should be replaced with  false , creating a procedure whose execution 
does terminate.  This is not a programming problem, not a computability problem, not a lack of 
expressiveness  of  Pascal.   The  problem  is  that  the  informal  boolean  expression  is  an 
inconsistent specification.  One might protest:
Either execution of  liar   terminates, or it doesn't.   If it  terminates, use  true  ;   if it 
doesn't, use  false .  How can there possibly be an inconsistency?
But I hope the inconsistency is clear enough that no-one will protest.  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As we did with the Liar's Paradox, let's present the same inconsistency as two declarations.
function halts: boolean;
begin
{ return  true  if execution of  diag  terminates; }
{ return  false  otherwise }
end;
procedure diag;
begin
if halts then diag
end
Only the header of function  halts  appears.  In place of the body there is a comment to specify 
what the body should be.  If execution of procedure  diag  terminates, then the body should be 
halts:= true .  If execution of procedure  diag  does not terminate, then the body should be 
halts:= false .  So there is no problem in programming the body.  The problem is to decide 
whether execution of  diag  terminates.  If we suppose it does, then  halts  should return  true , 
and so we see that execution of  diag  does not terminate.  If we suppose it does not, then  halts 
should return  false , and so we see that execution of  diag  does terminate.
Procedure  diag  has been written in its entirety.  Syntactically, it is a procedure;  to determine 
that  halts  is being used correctly within  diag , we need only the header for  halts , not the 
body, and we have the header.  Semantically, it is a procedure;  to determine the meaning of the 
call to  halts  within  diag , we need only the specification of  halts , not its implementation, and 
we have the specification.  (That important programming principle enables a programmer to call 
procedures written by other people, knowing only the specification, not the implementation.  It 
also enables a programmer to change the implementation of a procedure, but still satisfying the 
specification,  without  knowing where and why the procedure is  being called.)   So there is 
nothing wrong with the definition of  diag .  The problem is that we cannot write the body of 
halts   to satisfy its  specification.   This is  not a programming problem, not a computability 
problem, not a lack of expressiveness of Pascal.  The problem is that the specification of the 
body of  halts  is inconsistent.  One might protest:
Either execution of  diag  terminates, or it doesn't.  If it terminates, use  halts:= true ;  if 
it doesn't, use  halts:= false .  How can there possibly be an inconsistency?
The inconsistency cannot be seen by looking only at  halts  or only at  diag .  Each refers to the 
other, and together they are inconsistent.
Let  me  complicate  this  inconsistency  by  adding  a  parameter,  so   halts   can  say  whether 
execution of any parameterless Pascal procedure terminates, not just  diag .  To pass procedures 
as data, we need to encode them in some way, and the easiest encoding is as a character string. 
(Whenever programs are presented as input data to a compiler or interpreter, they are presented 
as character strings.)  We assume there is a dictionary of function and procedure definitions that 
is accessible to  halts , so that the call  halts ('diag')  allows  halts  to look up  'diag' , and 
subsequently  'halts' , in the dictionary, and retrieve their texts for analysis.
function halts (p: string): boolean;
{ return  true  if  p  represents a parameterless Pascal procedure whose execution terminates; }
{ return  false  otherwise }
procedure diag;
begin
if halts ('diag') then diag
end  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To determine that  diag  is syntactically a Pascal procedure, we need only the header for  halts , 
not the body, and we have the header.  To determine the semantics of  diag , we need only the 
specification of  halts , not its implementation, and we have the specification.
As before, we cannot write the body of  halts   to satisfy the specification.  No matter how 
carefully  worded  it  is,  no  matter  how  clear  it  sounds,  the  specification  conceals  an 
inconsistency.   The  inconsistency  is  revealed  by  applying   halts   to   'diag'  .   If 
halts ('diag') = true , then execution of  diag  is nonterminating, so  halts ('diag')  should be 
false .  If  halts ('diag') = false , then execution of  diag  is terminating, so  halts ('diag')  should 
be  true .  This is still not a programming problem, not a computability problem, not a lack of 
expressiveness  of  Pascal.   It  is  still  the  same  inconsistency  that  was  present  in  the 
unparameterized, unencoded version, and the same inconsistency that was present in the  liar 
procedure.  One might protest:
Either  execution  of  a  procedure  represented  by   p   terminates,  or  it  doesn't.   If  it 
terminates,  halts (p)  should return  true ;  if it doesn't,  halts (p)  should return  false . 
How can there possibly be an inconsistency?
Now the protest starts to sound more plausible because the parameter allows us to show a large 
number of examples which are not problematic.  For example,
halts ('stop') = true
halts ('go') = false
where  stop  and  go  are defined as
procedure stop; begin end
procedure go; begin go end
These  nonproblematic  examples  may fool  us  into  believing that  the  specification  of   halts 
makes sense.  But they are irrelevant.  Procedure  diag  shows us the inconsistency.
There is one last complication:  a second parameter so  halts  can say whether execution of any 
Pascal procedure with an input parameter terminates.
function halts (p, i: string): boolean;
{ return  true  if  p  represents a Pascal procedure with one string input parameter }
{ whose execution terminates when given input  i ;  return  false  otherwise }
procedure diag (s: string);
begin
if halts (s, s) then diag (s)
end
This is now a modern version of Turing's Halting Problem.  Turing's argument is as follows.
Assume that  halts  is computable, and that it has been programmed according to its 
specification.   Does  execution  of   diag  ('diag')   terminate?   If  it  terminates,  then 
halts ('diag', 'diag')  returns  true , and so we see from the body of  diag  that execution 
of  diag ('diag')  does not terminate.  If it does not terminate, then  halts ('diag', 'diag') 
returns  false , and so from the body of  diag , execution of  diag ('diag')  terminates. 
This is inconsistent.  Therefore function  halts  cannot have been programmed according 
to its specification;  halts  is incomputable.
The two parameters  (p, i)  make a two-dimensional space, and point  ('diag', 'diag')  is on its 
diagonal,  which is  why the argument  is  called a  diagonal  argument,  and why I  named the 
procedure  diag .  But any string would do equally well as a value for the second parameter, and 
the second parameter adds nothing to Turing's argument.
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The  surprise,  and  the  main  point  of  this  paper,  is  that  the  computability  assumption  is 
unnecessary to the argument.  Without assuming that  halts  is computable, I ask what the result 
of  halts ('diag', 'diag')  should be.  This is a question about the specification of  halts .  If it 
should be  true , then the semantics of  diag ('diag')  is nontermination, so  halts ('diag', 'diag') 
should be  false .  If it should be  false , then the semantics of  diag ('diag')  is termination, so it 
should be  true .  This is inconsistent.  Therefore  halts  cannot be programmed according to its 
specification.  But the problem is not incomputability;  it is inconsistency of specification.  It is 
the  same  inconsistency  that  was  present  in  all  previous  versions,  before  I  added  the 
complications of parameters and encodings.  It is just the Liar's Paradox in fancy clothing.  In 
fact, Turing's argument could have been applied to procedure  liar  with equal (in)validity.
procedure liar;
begin
if (execution of  liar  terminates) then liar
end
Assume that the expression (execution of  liar  terminates) is computable, and that it has 
been programmed according to its specification.  Does execution of  liar  terminate?  If it 
terminates, then (execution of  liar  terminates) is  true , and so we see from the body of 
liar  that its execution does not terminate.  If it does not terminate, then (execution of 
liar  terminates) is  false , and so from the body of  liar  its execution terminates.  This is 
inconsistent.  Therefore the expression (execution of  liar  terminates) cannot have been 
programmed according to its specification;  it is incomputable.
Turing's argument can be applied to any property of program execution.  For example,
procedure liar1;
begin
if (execution of  liar1  prints  'A' ) then print ('B') else print ('A')
end
Termination of execution of  liar1  is not in question:  when  (execution of  liar1  prints  'A' )  is 
replaced with either  true  or  false , whichever is appropriate, execution of  liar1  terminates. 
The question is whether  'A'  or  'B'  is printed.  Turing's argument says that the property “prints 
'A' ” is incomputable, and so is every property of program execution (except for the trivial 
“always  true ” and “always  false ” properties) [3].  But the problem is not incomputability; 
the problem is inconsistency of specification.
Underdetermination
The Liar's Paradox, the Gödel sentence, and Halting Problem are all examples of inconsistency, 
which is also known as overdetermination.  Here, “determination” means ruling out possible 
solutions:  if we rule out all possible solutions, we have overdetermination;  if we are left with 
more than one possible solution, we have underdetermination.  An example is the sentence
This sentence is true.
Whereas the Liar's Paradox can be neither true nor false, the sentence just written can be either 
true or false.  Giving the sentence the name  U  for underdetermined, it becomes the formula
U = (U=true)
As an equation in unknown  U , it has two solutions:  both  true  and  false .
Here is another example.
B (s)   =   true  if string  s  represents a provable boolean expression;
     false  otherwise
H   =   “ B (H) = true ”
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Now we ask:  Is  B (H) = true ?  If we suppose  B (H) = true , then  H  represents a  true 
sentence, and in a complete logic, all  true  sentences are provable, so   B (H)  should be  true , 
as supposed.  If we suppose  B (H) = false , then  H  represents a  false  sentence, and in a 
consistent logic, no  false  sentence is provable, so  B (H)  should be  false , as supposed.  The 
specification of  B  is both overdetermined (for  G ) and underdetermined (for  H ).
Here is the final example.
function halts (p, i: string): boolean;
{ return  true  if  p  represents a Pascal procedure with one string input parameter }
{ whose execution terminates when given input  i ;  return  false  otherwise }
procedure what (s: string);
begin
if not halts (s, s) then what (s)
end
That is the same  halts  specification as before;  it says that the  halts  function will tell us 
whether the execution of a procedure terminates.  What does it say about  what ?  If we suppose 
that  halts ('what', 'what') = true , we see from the body of  what  that its execution terminates, 
so that was the right supposition.  If we suppose that  halts ('what', 'what') = false , we see from 
the body of  what  that its execution does not terminate, so again that was the right supposition. 
We have come to another inadequacy of the  halts  specification.  The specification sounds just 
right:  neither overdetermined nor underdetermined.  But we are forced by the examples to 
admit that the specification is not as it sounds.  In at least one instance ( diag  ),  the  halts 
specification is overdetermined, and in at least one instance ( what ), the  halts  specification is 
underdetermined.
Conclusion
Epimenides' conclusion was:
It is inconsistent to ask for a function whose result is  true  for all and only those strings 
representing true sentences in a sufficiently expressive language.
Gödel's conclusion was:
It is inconsistent to ask for a function whose result is  true  for all and only those strings 
representing provable sentences in a sufficiently expressive language.
Turing's conclusion should have been:
It is inconsistent to ask for a function, written in a programming language, whose result 
is   true   for all  and only those strings representing procedures,  written in that  same 
language, whose execution terminates.
If  “incomputable”  meant  having  an  inconsistent  specification,  then   halts   would  be 
incomputable.  But “incomputable” does not mean “inconsistent”.  It means that a well-defined 
mathematical function, one with a consistent specification, cannot be computed using a Turing-
Machine-equivalent programming language.  That question has not been addressed.
Conjecture
I conjecture that every consistent first-order specification is satisfied by a computable function. 
This conjecture is a bit like the Löwenheim-Skolem theorem that every consistent first-order 
theory has a countable model.
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